Utah Divorce Mandate Rule
Mintz v. Mintz applies the Utah divorce mandate rule to reverse an award of investment appreciation and related fees. The investment-income challenge to alimony failed for lack of preservation; the court did not resolve its merits. Judge Harris concurred in part and dissented in part. See ¶¶ 25–31 and the separate opinion beginning at paragraph 33. The full opinion follows.
Mintz v. Mintz, 2026 UT App 170 (opinion PDF)
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAYNA ELIZABETH MINTZ,
Appellee,
v. GLEN RYAN MINTZ,
Appellant.
Opinion No. 20240056-CA Filed November 5, 2026
Third District Court, Silver Summit Department
The Honorable Kent R. Holmberg
No. 174500034
Thomas J. Burns, Attorney for Appellant
Julie J. Nelson and Michael J. Teter, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER concurred. JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 Glen and Rayna Mintz divorced after a lengthy marriage.[1] After entry of the divorce decree, findings of fact, and conclusions of law (the Decree), both parties appealed on various grounds. As relevant here, this court remanded the case with instructions to include investment expenditures in the alimony calculations. We also concluded that the district court was without jurisdiction to increase Rayna’s share of certain investment accounts by a proportion of their appreciation. After remand, Glen alleges error in the district court’s resolution of these two issues. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In February 2023, this court issued Mintz v. Mintz, and the underlying matter was remanded to the district court in July 2023 after our supreme court denied Glen’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 2023 UT App 17, 525 P.3d 534, cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). In the first appeal, Rayna had challenged the district court’s denial of what she had titled a “motion to enforce” concerning the appreciation of the value of investment accounts from which Glen was ordered to pay Rayna sums certain. Id. ¶¶ 44–47. Before the hearing on the motion, however, Rayna had filed a notice of appeal. Id. ¶ 9. At the hearing, the district court looked at and interpreted its own order; the district court stated that to do what Rayna was requesting would not be merely enforcing the order but “read[ing] language into the Decree and interpret[ing] the Decree in a way that modified or amended” it. Id. (cleaned up).[2] Based on its reading and interpretation of its own order, the district court denied the motion on jurisdictional grounds. Id. On appeal, this court relied on the district court’s own reading and interpretation of its own order, affirming the ruling because “to award the relief that Rayna sought would require the district court to read language into the Decree in a way that modified or amended it,” which the district court lacked jurisdiction to do since Rayna had made the motion after the original appeal was in process. See id. ¶¶ 45–46 (cleaned up). Our remand order, as applied to this issue, simply affirmed the district court’s rejection of Rayna’s arguments concerning the appreciation issue and did not direct the district court to address that issue further. See id. ¶ 60.[3]
¶3 On remand and contrary to our mandate, Rayna filed a motion to set aside a portion of the Decree and award her a percentage of the appreciation accrued in the investment accounts pursuant to rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,[4] which she then supplemented to include a rule 60(a) argument.[5] The district court rejected those arguments but determined that Rayna was entitled to renew her motion to enforce. Through that renewed motion, Rayna asked the district court to enforce the Decree by entry of a judgment awarding her a percentage of the appreciation of the investment accounts, plus interest. The district court granted Rayna’s motion and entered the judgment.
¶4 Also after the remand, Rayna filed a motion seeking an increase in her alimony, which was within the scope of the mandate. The district court granted the motion, specifically, as relevant here, increasing her alimony to include amounts for regular investment.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶5 On appeal, Glen argues that the district court erred in ordering him to pay Rayna a proportionate share of the post-trial appreciation earned in investment accounts. “We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation. Accordingly, we review the district court’s interpretation of the decree for correctness.” Holt v. Holt, 2024 UT App 6, ¶ 17, 543 P.3d 214 (cleaned up). And “because the mandate is a legal determination, reviewing whether a district court complied with the mandate presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ¶ 8, 218 P.3d 583.
¶6 Glen next asserts that the district court exceeded its discretion by including in Rayna’s monthly expenses amounts for the historic pattern of investment without factoring in the return on the investments. “This court reviews a district court’s alimony determination for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb its ruling on alimony as long as the court exercises its discretion within the bounds and under the standards Utah appellate courts have set and has supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions.” Eberhard v. Eberhard, 2019 UT App 114, ¶ 3, 449 P.3d 202 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
I. Post-Trial Appreciation of Investment Accounts
¶7 Glen argues that the district court erred in granting Rayna’s motion seeking enforcement of her claim to receive a proportionate share of the appreciation earned in investment accounts between the date of the trial and the date of entry of the Decree. Glen asserts that the district court’s enforcement order violates the mandate rule.[6] We agree with Glen.
A. The Mandate Rule Precludes Modification
¶8 In the first appeal, we affirmed “the district court’s determination that the relief Rayna requested in her [original] motion to enforce would have required it to amend the [D]ecree and that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 60, 525 P.3d 534, cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).[7] But we gave no remand instruction with regard to this issue. We simply explained why the district court got it right and left it at that. Thus, we accepted and relied upon the district court’s interpretation of its own order prior to rendering our decision in Mintz. But the district court has now advanced two contradictory positions at different times. And under the mandate rule, when the district court told us the conflicting interpretations matters.
¶9 “The mandate rule . . . applies after a case has been appealed. Once an appellate court issues its decision, both the appellate court’s pronouncements on legal issues and the prior decisions of the trial court generally become mandatory . . . . The purpose of the rule is to protect against reargument of settled issues and to assure adherence of the trial courts to appellate decisions.” State v. Blake, 2025 UT 21, ¶ 22, 582 P.3d 705 (cleaned up). When a remand does “not direct the court to take any action with respect” to a particular issue, the mandate rule “does not allow the court to award additional affirmative relief.” Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2021 UT App 38, ¶ 24, 491 P.3d 110. Put another way, under the mandate rule “a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding on successive stages of the same litigation” and “a district court’s power to reconsider decided issues is limited when the case has been . . . remanded.” Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 2015 UT App 128, ¶ 18, 351 P.3d 114 (cleaned up). “Thus, the decisions of an appellate court become the law of the case and cannot be reconsidered on remand.” Id. (cleaned up).
Accordingly, “the mandate rule requires a district court on remand to effect [the appellate court’s] mandate and to do nothing else.” General Universal Sys., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). In addition to limiting the district court, the mandate rule also binds “the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ¶ 12, 218 P.3d 583 (cleaned up).
¶10 Moreover, under the law of the case doctrine, of which the mandate rule is a branch, see NPEC LLC v. Miller, 2018 UT App 85, ¶ 6, 427 P.3d 357, “issues resolved by this court on appeal . . . generally bind this court should the case return on appeal after remand,” Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, ¶ 9, 31 P.3d 543. Thus, “[w]e are not immune from the effects of our decisions. And we are generally bound by our prior decisions in the same case.” Bank of Am., NA v. Sundquist, 2018 UT 58, ¶ 18, 430 P.3d 623; see also Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995) (“The law of the case is a legal doctrine under which a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.” (cleaned up)). As our supreme court has succinctly put it, the “mandate is also binding on the appellate court should the case return on appeal after remand.” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d 588.
¶11 The district court, in what appears to be an effort to repair what it considered to be a lapse of its own in drafting the Decree, elected on remand to disregard the mandate articulated in the original appeal. But the district court lacked the authority to supersede this court’s holdings, even if the district court had regrets concerning what it perceived to be an error in the Decree. Put simply, after remand, reading language that did not exist into the Decree was a patent violation of the mandate rule and an error on the part of the district court.
¶12 The reality is that Rayna presented this issue to this court in the prior appeal. This court, agreeing with the district court, held in its issued opinion that the relief sought by Rayna required modification of the plain language of the Decree. That holding was unequivocal and unambiguous. The remand instructions stated that “we affirm the district court’s determination that the relief Rayna requested in her motion to enforce would have required it to amend” the Decree and instructed the district court “to engage in further proceedings as necessary to effectuate the holdings provided in this opinion.” Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 60. Nothing in our opinion suggested that the district court had the authority to revisit its prior determination—which we affirmed—that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the Decree to include an award to Rayna of appreciation on the investment accounts.
¶13 The district court nevertheless determined that it had such authority and elected its own path on remand. It entertained Rayna’s revived motion to enforce, read into the Decree language that this court (and the district court) had determined did not exist, and thereafter entered a judgment ordering Glen to transfer to Rayna a share of the appreciated value of the investment accounts and ordering him to pay attorney fees. All this happened because the district court concluded that the language of the Decree supported Rayna’s renewed request, contrary to this court’s conclusion (and its own) in the prior appeal. The district court was in error, and we reverse its judgment ordering Glen to pay a percentage of the appreciation to Rayna and the related attorney fees and costs.
B. Manifest Injustice
¶14 Rayna resists this application of the mandate rule. She argues that this court’s prior decision—which gave rise to the mandate—focused “only on jurisdictional questions,” a circumstance that she insists allowed her to renew her motion to enforce on remand.[8] Concomitantly, she asserts that the law of the case doctrine—along with its subset, the mandate rule—“contains an exception to prevent manifest injustice when a court believes that its earlier ruling was erroneous.” See IHC Health Services, 2008 UT 73, ¶ 34 (“The law of the case doctrine does not apply . . . when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” (cleaned up)). Rayna argues that the district court’s ruling on remand worked to correct the manifest injustice by which “Glen gained the benefit of not only the appreciation of the marital home and the investments awarded to him, but also the appreciation of the property awarded to Rayna.”
¶15 As to the merits of the claim that the district court’s earlier ruling (namely, that the first motion to enforce was really a petition to amend the Decree) was in clear error, we determine that no manifest injustice proceeded from it. This was not a purely jurisdictional ruling as Rayna suggests. But in order to explain why there was no manifest injustice to address here, we must revisit in some detail the manner in which the Decree divided the investment accounts as sums certain.
¶16 At issue here is Paragraph 171(b) of the Decree, which reads,
Lines[[9]] 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 (as well as Line 19, above): These accounts are not liquid accounts; rather, the values set forth relate to the current values of the shares of stock (or bonds) held in each account. Rather than liquidate these accounts to accomplish the distribution (and creating a likely, but unknown, tax liability), Glen is to transfer securities to match the value awarded from each account as of the date of stock transfer. For example, for Line 27, Glen is to transfer stock valued at $1,100,000[[10]] on the date [the[11]] stock is transferred to Rayna.[[12]] When each of these investment accounts is split, each component of the account should be split as a percentage created by the awarded amount. If for some reason unknown at this time to the trial record, this is not possible, then the split should be as equal as possible, taking into account the financial realities of each investment. If the parties are unable to agree on how this should be distributed, then a special master may need to be appointed to prepare a proposed distribution for the court.
The specific lines (namely, lines 19, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 30) mentioned above refer to six investment accounts that were divided between Glen and Rayna pursuant to the divorce action. Three of those accounts (namely, 19, 25, and 26) were divided equally, and three others (namely, 27, 28, and 30) were divided with about 94%, 57%, and 72% of each asset, respectively, going to Rayna.[13] However, rather than expressing the divisions in terms of these percentages, the appendix represented the split in terms of sums certain based on the value of the assets at the time of trial.
¶17 The issue here involves the substantial appreciation of these six assets—to the tune of $1.8 million—between the time of trial and the date of the entry of the Decree, leading to Rayna’s claim that her allocation of that increase totaled nearly $850,000.[14] After the first appeal, Rayna filed a renewed motion to enforce in order to obtain this amount, plus attorney fees and interest. Glen opposed this motion, arguing that the Decree did not require him to transfer any of the appreciated value to Rayna. He asserted that the plain language of the Decree required nothing more than that he transfer the sum certain for each asset listed in the appendix.
¶18 The district court agreed with Rayna, taking the “opportunity to elucidate” its “intended approach” regarding the division of the assets when it drafted Paragraph 171(b). It first stated that the relevant assets had been split “based on the percentage derived from the relative values represented in each party’s column” in the appendix. Thus, the court purported to clarify that the values in the appendix “were provided for two purposes: (a) to reflect the then-current values of the shares of stock in the [investment accounts] and (b) for the parties to derive their respective percentages for the split that would occur on the date of the stock transfer.” It then stated that its intent was that when “Glen ultimately made the stock transfer to Rayna, he would transfer securities following this procedure: (a) assess the current value of each account on the date of the stock transfer and (b) apply the percentages derived from the allocations set forth in [the appendix] to the then-current value of the securities being transferred.” The court then stated without equivocation that it never “espoused” the principle that Rayna was to receive the “exact amounts set forth” in the appendix but, instead, that it “intended for Rayna to receive the appreciation of her portions” of the investment accounts. After additional briefing and argument, the court ruled that the Decree’s language was “consistent with the request in the motion to enforce.” Specifically, the court stated that it “never intended what Glen is arguing” but “intended what Rayna is arguing, which is that at the time of the [Decree], whatever up or down happened with those specific accounts was to be shared between the parties.”
¶19 The problem with the district court’s elucidation after the first appeal is threefold. First, as we have noted, the district court did not have the authority to make this ruling under the scope of the mandate on remand. Second, even if it did, the court’s elucidation does not comport with the plain language of Paragraph 171(b). And third, the court’s elucidation contradicts the ruling it made prior to the first appeal in this very matter, a ruling that we affirmed. Since we have already addressed the mandate issue above, we focus our analysis here on the second and third points.
¶20 The plain language of Paragraph 171(b) states in relevant part, “When each of these investment accounts is split, each component of the account should be split as a percentage created by the awarded amount.” This is curious language if it is read through the lens of the district court’s purported elucidation. The district court (and Rayna on appeal) appears to have relied on this provision for its requirement that Glen split the appreciated value according to the percentages derived from the sum-certain split in the appendix. But that is not what the plain language of Paragraph 171(b) says. Rather, the provision says that “when each investment account is split, “each component” of each account should be split as a percentage derived from the sum certain. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, this is how Rayna understood the language in the original appeal. In her briefing in that appeal, she helpfully pointed out that Paragraph 171(b) originally ended after the third sentence. See supra note 12. She explained that the “remainder was added after Rayna expressed concern that Glen would transfer her ‘bad’ stocks.” Indeed, Rayna’s counsel below explicitly argued this point: “Glen controls those assets . . . . And so our concern is that he could transfer to Rayna values of particular holdings that he recognizes either have a very high basis or [that] he knows are going to dive in three days, or some other kind of consequence that could severely affect their value.” This concern indicates that Rayna understood the split to be a sum certain rather than a percentage. In other words, Rayna wanted to make sure that her sum-certain allocation reflected that same percentage of each stock making up each investment account rather than have her sum-certain allocation consist of a disproportionate amount of underperforming stock.
¶21 And this is how the district court understood the language in its original ruling on the matter prior to the first appeal. Following entry of the Decree, Rayna filed a motion to enforce on June 25, 2020, asserting that various investment accounts at issue in the divorce “were not divided immediately after trial and that they subsequently appreciated in value.”[15] Accordingly, Rayna sought an order requiring Glen to transfer holdings “equivalent to her proportionate share of appreciation since trial.” But before the hearing on that motion, Rayna filed a notice of appeal. At the hearing on the motion, the district court stated that Rayna’s motion was “captioned as a motion to enforce a judgment, not to amend or modify it.” “At first glance,” the court observed, such a motion “would appear to fall within the recognized exception to the general divestment of jurisdiction upon appeal.” But “[u]pon closer examination,” the court determined that the order Rayna requested would require it not just to enforce the Decree but to “read language into [the Decree] and interpret [the Decree] in a way that modifie[d] or amend[ed]” it. The court stated that Paragraph 171(b) required Glen “to ‘transfer’ equities valued at the exact amounts [as] set forth” in the appendix. (Emphasis added.) In making this determination, the district court acknowledged that Rayna was urging the court to adopt an interpretation of Paragraph 171(b) “that would include the transfer of all post-trial appreciation over and above the exact figures set forth” in the appendix. (Emphasis added.) But the court denied this request, concluding that Rayna was “not merely seeking enforcement, but rather seeking precisely the type of amendment or modification of a judgment which the [district court] no longer [had] jurisdiction to undertake.” In other words, the reason that the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Rayna’s motion was that doing so would require it to modify and amend the Decree. And this was the very ruling we affirmed in the first appeal that created the scope of the mandate.
¶22 Given this background, it is clear that the conditions necessary to establish manifest injustice simply are not present here. “When reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, we generally use the same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists . . . . That standard is two-pronged. First, the error must be obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party.” State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up); see also State v. Cooper, 2011 UT App 234, ¶ 8, 261 P.3d 653 (“In most circumstances the term manifest injustice is synonymous with the plain error standard.” (cleaned up)); Burge v. Facio, 2004 UT App 54, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d 350 (“In order to reverse the trial court’s distribution of property in a divorce action, we must find that it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.” (cleaned up)). The putative error of the district court here—the same “error” that we affirmed in the first appeal—was hardly obvious.[16] To the contrary, the alleged error was so cloaked in subtlety that it went unnoticed by Rayna in her briefing in the first appeal. And more than being unnoticed, Rayna provided a cogent explanation for why the wording of Paragraph 171(b) was adopted, namely, to ensure that Rayna received a proportionate share of the stocks making up each investment account rather than being stuck by Glen with underperforming stocks.
¶23 The district court’s original conclusion that Rayna’s motion to enforce was really a motion to modify or amend the Decree makes perfect sense. And with this background in mind, Paragraph 171(b) was sufficiently clear that there simply aren’t grounds to conclude that the plain error standard—which must be met in a manifest injustice analysis—has been satisfied.
C. Clerical Mistake
¶24 Rayna also argues that we could affirm the district court’s award of the appreciated value of the investment accounts on the alternative grounds identified in her rule 60(a) motion by inferring that the district court’s order merely clarified the meaning of Paragraph 171(b), which she characterizes as a clerical error consisting of a lack of conformity between the Decree and the intention of the court. But Paragraph 171(b) was not plagued by a clerical error merely needing a simple and obvious correction. See State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ¶ 29, 218 P.3d 610 (“To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, [an appellate] court will look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment. An error is clerical when it is a mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record.” (cleaned up)). As should be clear from our discussion of manifest injustice, see supra ¶¶ 14–23, the district court viewed the clarification Rayna sought as a modification to the Decree, notwithstanding the court’s later characterization of the request (after the mandate) as a mere elucidation of its “intended approach” regarding the division of the assets in Paragraph 171(b) when it granted her motion to enforce on remand.
¶25 Because the district court’s decision did not work a manifest injustice and was not the result of clerical error, we reverse the judgment requiring Glen to pay the appreciation and fees.[17]
II. Alimony Calculation
¶26 Glen’s second claim on appeal is that the district court exceeded its discretion by including in Rayna’s monthly expenses an amount for the parties’ historic pattern of investment without factoring in the return on the investments as part of her income.
He relies on Dutcher v. Dutcher, which was issued after the first appeal, for the proposition that—in his words—“returns on investment income must be considered if a court is to include investment as a category of expense in the context of alimony.” See 2025 UT App 21, ¶ 20, 566 P.3d 48. Glen asserts that Dutcher “transformed” this issue through its recognition that investment income must be considered in awarding alimony that includes money for investments, which he asserts “represents a clear evolution of the law.”
¶27 But as Glen fully acknowledges, he made no mention of the legal theory he discerns in Dutcher to the district court, and he never asked the district court to consider increasing Rayna’s income figure pursuant to the principles articulated there. See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 35, 379 P.3d 890 (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. In other words, the issue must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.” (cleaned up)).
¶28 In the prior appeal, we held that the district court had erred when it calculated Rayna’s alimony award without including in her expenses a line item that was reflective of the parties’ historical practice of investment. See Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶¶ 16–28, 525 P.3d 534, cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). We remanded the case to the district court with instructions “to recalculate alimony based on the amount that the couple’s historical investment contributed to the marital standard of living.” Id. ¶ 28. On remand, the court considered this issue, and it ruled that the parties had historically set aside more than $30,000 per month for “savings and investments.” It then included half that amount—more than $15,000—as a new line item in Rayna’s monthly expenses. After completing the other pieces of the alimony calculation, the court ordered that Rayna’s total monthly alimony award be increased by nearly $10,000. At no point in this process did the court consider—nor was it ever asked to consider—whether to increase Rayna’s income figure in view of the fact that these significant monthly investments might provide some income to her.
¶29 About a year later, after Glen filed this appeal, this court decided Dutcher. In that case, we held that in situations where a court is confronted with the question of whether to include an investments line item in an alimony calculation, “the court may decide to either include the returns from the [investment] account in its calculation of [the recipient spouse’s] income and include the line items in the alimony calculation or do the opposite, declining to impute the returns as income but also declining to include duplicative alimony line items.” 2025 UT App 21, ¶ 20. But we clearly stated that the court “may not do both.” Id. Notably, the Dutcher court acknowledged that the factual situation underlying this principle was not present in Mintz. Dutcher, 2025 UT App 21, ¶ 18 (citing Mintz as a case where both parties viewed investment income strictly as a growth vehicle to build savings and increase net worth instead of representing spendable income and stating that such a scenario was not “present here”).
¶30 We are precluded from considering this principle from Dutcher because it was not raised at the district court level in the first instance.
¶31 Accordingly, we decline to consider whether the district court exceeded its discretion by not including potential investment income in Rayna’s monthly income calculation, despite including in Rayna’s monthly expenses an amount for the parties’ historic pattern of investment, because this matter was never raised before the district court and was therefore not properly preserved for our review. See Reyos v. State, 2026 UT 18, ¶ 31, 594 P.3d 532 (“An issue [is] new on appeal when the appellant raises a legal theory entirely distinct from the legal theory the appellant raised to the district court. And while appellants may rely on new authority or cases supporting an issue that was properly preserved, they may not evade the preservation rule by broadly defining the issue raised in the district court.” (cleaned up)).[18]
CONCLUSION
¶32 The district court exceeded its mandate in ordering Glen to pay Rayna a proportionate share of the post-trial appreciation earned in investment accounts, and the resulting distribution of the appreciation to Glen is not a manifest injustice or the result of clerical error. We decline to consider, on preservation grounds, whether the district court’s award of alimony to include amounts for investment without factoring in the return on the investments was erroneous under the principle articulated in Dutcher.
¶33 Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
HARRIS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
¶34 I join Part II of the lead opinion in full. I agree that Glen failed to preserve his argument that the district court should have increased Rayna’s income (along with adding a line item to her expenses for investments) to account for potential income from those investments. Glen didn’t make this argument to the district court, and I agree with the lead opinion that we therefore shouldn’t reach that issue here.
¶35 But I am unable to join Part I of the lead opinion. I would resolve the issue discussed there—the one about who bears the risk of depreciation (or realizes the benefit of appreciation) in the parties’ financial accounts between the time of trial and the time of entry of the Decree—on a completely different basis than my colleagues, and I would affirm the ruling of the district court.
I. Allocation of Appreciation/Depreciation
¶36 The first issue Glen raises has to do with what I believe is an ambiguity in the Decree regarding which party is to bear the risk of depreciation (or enjoy the benefit of appreciation) in the parties’ financial accounts during the elongated interim period—amounting to more than thirteen months—between the trial and the entry of the Decree. The Decree is far from clear on this point, and this entire first issue therefore centers on what the court’s actual intent was in drafting the findings and on what the procedural mechanism ought to be for clearing this issue up.
¶37 In my view, the resolution reached by the lead opinion is unsatisfactory. According to the lead opinion, the Decree is “plain” on the point, see supra ¶ 20, and therefore the majority sees no need to try to listen to the district court’s own explanation of what the Decree means. In this case especially—where the court went to a lot of work to personally draft the Decree and the associated findings—it seems important to me to allow the court the opportunity to tell us what it meant.
¶38 In explaining the conclusion I reach on this issue, I emphasize five points, the first three of which have to do with how we assess and review the district court’s explanation of its intent in drafting the Decree. First, I register my disagreement with the lead opinion’s articulated standard for reviewing the district court’s interpretation of a document it personally drafted. As I see it, we should in this case review the court’s interpretation of the Decree with considerable deference and not for correctness. Second, applying that standard of review, the district court’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous ruling is nowhere near an abuse of its rather wide discretion in this space. And third, I offer my view that we were wrong, in our first decision in this case, when we held that it would have “required an amendment to the [D]ecree” for the district court to offer a clarification as to its intent when it drafted Paragraph 171(b) of the Decree. See Mintz v. Mintz (Mintz I), 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 44, 525 P.3d 534. The district court’s efforts to explain what it meant when it drafted the words of the Decree are simply an effort to explain an ambiguity, and resolution of ambiguities is not the type of action that requires an amendment or modification to the document.
¶39 The next two points I discuss have to do with the procedural hurdles that exist here due to this case’s convoluted procedural history. First, I acknowledge that given our ruling in Mintz I, the mandate rule applies generally to this situation; on this point, the lead opinion and I are in agreement. But I part ways with the lead opinion on the next point: because I believe Mintz I was wrong on the relevant legal issue, and because I believe that we need to listen to the district court when it tells us what it intended in making its findings after trial, I therefore believe that the manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine should be applied here, in order to allow the district court the opportunity to explain its intentions in drafting Paragraph 171(b) of the Decree and to allow the result in this case to match the court’s findings made after trial. On this basis, I would vote to affirm the court’s ruling on that point.
A. I Would Review the District Court’s Interpretation of Its Own Order with Considerable Deference
¶40 My first point of disagreement with the lead opinion is with its statement that “we review the district court’s interpretation of the decree for correctness.” See supra ¶ 5 (quoting Holt v. Holt, 2024 UT App 6, ¶ 17, 543 P.3d 214 (cleaned up)). I do not necessarily take issue with this statement as a general proposition; indeed, we have incanted these words on quite a number of occasions. See, e.g., Holt, 2024 UT App 6, ¶ 17; Mintz I, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 14 (“We review for correctness the district court’s interpretation of a divorce decree.”); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41, ¶ 5, 248 P.3d 65 (noting that courts “interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contractual interpretation,” and stating that the court would “therefore review the trial court’s interpretation of the [d]ecree for correctness”). This line of cases is not incorrect, as far as it goes, but I take issue with the notion that the general proposition articulated there applies with full force in every case, as well as with the assertion that it applies in this one.
¶41 The problem, as I see it, is that we have also stated the opposite in quite a number of cases. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Utah Transit Auth., 2020 UT App 144, ¶ 30, 477 P.3d 472 (“[W]e afford great deference to a district court’s interpretation of its own order and review such an interpretation only for abuse of discretion.”); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kunz, 2020 UT App 139, ¶ 25, 476 P.3d 989; In re A.R., 2017 UT App 154, ¶ 12, 402 P.3d 199. This contrary line of cases relies upon an opinion from our supreme court, in which the court stated plainly that “[a] court’s interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great deference.” Uintah Basin Med. Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 786.
¶42 Our supreme court derived this principle from a Seventh Circuit case. See id. (citing Enodis Corp. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau (In re Consol. Indus. Corp.), 360 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2004)). In that case, the Seventh Circuit stated that it would “not reverse a court’s interpretation of its own order unless it [was] a clear abuse of discretion, because a court that issued an order is in the best position to interpret it.” Enodis Corp., 360 F.3d at 716 (cleaned up). Other federal circuit courts have made the same point. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We review a district court’s interpretation of its own order for abuse of
discretion.”); Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc., 60 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is peculiarly within the province of the district court to determine the meaning of its own order, and the court’s interpretation of its own order will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (cleaned up)). Other state courts of last resort appear to be in agreement as well; indeed, perhaps the clearest statement of the issue was offered by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which observed that “because the trial judge who issues the order that is the subject of subsequent clarification is familiar with the entire record and, of course, with the order itself, that judge is in the best position to clarify any ambiguity in the order.” State v. Denya, 986 A.2d 260, 268–69 (Conn. 2010). For that reason, the court held that “substantial deference” should be “accorded to a court’s interpretation of its own order.” Id. at 269.
¶43 From these disparate lines of cases, I distill some principles that, in my view, are not at odds with one another. First, the line of cases affording no deference to a court’s interpretation of a divorce decree draws upon principles of contract law and appears to assume that the decree in question is something that has been agreed upon by the parties in much the same way a contract would have been. See Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41, ¶ 5 (invoking contract-law principles). The other line of cases, by contrast, does not invoke contract-law principles but, instead, appears to assume that the court interpreting the order had a hand in drafting it. See Enodis Corp., 360 F.3d at 716 (“A court that issued an order is in the best position to interpret it.” (cleaned up)).
¶44 Thus, both lines of cases appear to be implicitly referencing the non-controversial principle that a court’s primary task, in interpreting any document, is to ascertain the intent of the person or people who drafted it. When interpreting statutes, for instance, “our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (cleaned up). And when interpreting contracts, the “overriding principle” is that the “intentions of the parties are
controlling.” Layton City v. Stevenson, 2014 UT 37, ¶ 21, 337 P.3d 242 (cleaned up).
¶45 Thus, by giving voice to the guiding principle underlying both lines of cases, they can easily be reconciled. When the divorce decree in question is a stipulated decree that was agreed upon by the parties and simply submitted to the court for signature without any trial having been held, the better approach is to apply contract-law principles in evaluating a court’s interpretation of the decree because, in that situation, the true drafters of the document are the parties, not the court. Under those circumstances, it makes sense to review the court’s interpretation of the document for correctness, just as we would in a case in which a court has offered its interpretation, as a matter of law, of a commercial agreement between contracting parties. See Holt, 2024 UT App 6, ¶ 17.
¶46 But on the other hand, when the divorce decree in question is the product of a trial in which the court has heard the evidence and made its own findings, the better approach is to afford deference to the court’s interpretation of that decree. See Enodis Corp., 360 F.3d at 716. And in my view, this is especially true where the court took the time to draft its own order and did not just sign a proposed order drafted by the parties and submitted to it for signature. In such a situation, the true drafter of the document is the court itself. And where a trial judge takes the time to compose and draft his or her own order, there is no person better positioned to tell us what the true intent was—and to resolve any ambiguities—than the drafting judge him- or herself.
¶47 In this case, the trial judge, following a multi-day trial, drafted the Decree himself. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge asked each side to submit proposed findings and a proposed decree. Each side did so, and the court took the parties’ input and then drafted its own Decree, including associated findings. Regarding Paragraph 171(b) in particular, the court appears to
have used Glen’s proposed findings as a sort of template, but the court made significant changes to Glen’s proposal; most notably, the court appears to have come up with the language of the phrase at the root of the issue here—“Glen is to transfer securities to match the value awarded from each account as of the date of stock transfer” (emphasis added)—entirely on its own.
¶48 In this situation, the district court should be considered the drafter of the document in question. And if the goal here is to be able to ascertain the intent of that drafter in clarifying any ambiguous language, it would be nonsensical for us to ignore—or second-guess—that drafter’s own statement as to what it meant when it drafted that language. Thus, when the district court tells us what it meant when it drafted the operative language, we owe it to ourselves and to the parties to listen.[19]
¶49 For these reasons, I would afford considerable deference, in this case, to the district court’s explanation about what it meant when it drafted the contested language. In this context, that means that I would defer to the court’s explanation unless it was “a clear abuse of discretion.” See Enodis Corp., 360 F.3d at 716; accord Uintah Basin Med. Center, 2008 UT 15, ¶ 9.
B. The District Court’s Interpretation Was Reasonable
¶50 Here, the district court’s interpretation is a reasonable one and is nowhere near a clear abuse of its considerable discretion to interpret its own order.
¶51 In explaining my position on this point, I need to begin by registering my disagreement with the majority’s contention that the language of Paragraph 171(b) of the Decree is “plain.” See supra ¶ 20. In my view, it clearly isn’t; it’s ambiguous, because both parties offer interpretations of the Decree that are supported by the text of the document (and the attached spreadsheet) but that suffer from certain infirmities. In that situation, ambiguity exists. See Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ¶ 24, 367 P.3d 994 (“A contract is facially ambiguous if its terms are capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.” (cleaned up)).
¶52 I acknowledge that Glen’s interpretation finds some support in the language of the Decree. That language commanded him to “transfer securities to match the value awarded from each account,” and it offered an example linking his obligation to the amounts listed on the referenced spreadsheet. And the spreadsheet lists exact dollar amounts, from each account, to which Rayna is apparently entitled. Thus, it is not as if Glen’s proffered interpretation of the Decree—that he was obligated to transfer to Rayna only those exact amounts listed in Rayna’s column on the spreadsheet—is entirely without support.
¶53 But as Rayna points out in her appellate briefing, Glen’s position also contains significant infirmities, especially given that the spreadsheet contains sum-certain figures for both Glen and Rayna. Glen’s interpretation appears to rest on the assumption that the figure in Rayna’s column is meaningful but that the figure in his own column is not; after all, if Glen pays Rayna only the sum-certain amount listed in her column, then (by virtue of him keeping the appreciation) he ends up keeping an amount greater than the sum-certain amount listed in his own column. And it cannot be the case that the figures in both parties’ columns represent their entitlements, because if both parties simply took what was in their columns, that would create a category of funds that no one was awarded.
¶54 This is a classic case of ambiguity: neither the parties nor the court appear to have contemplated that it would take more than thirteen months following the trial to get the Decree entered, and thus allocation of appreciation (or depreciation) does not appear to have been an issue explicitly addressed by the parties in their draft findings or by the court in its completed ones. No language in the Decree definitively resolves the question either way, and both sides point to certain things in the text of the Decree and in the referenced spreadsheet that support their positions.
¶55 When a document is ambiguous, the very best way to resolve that ambiguity is to ask the drafter what he or she meant. And here, the drafter (the trial judge) told us exactly what he meant. In a minute entry ruling, the court—for the first time—took the “opportunity to elucidate on [its] intended approach” in drafting Paragraph 171(b). It explained that it had intended to split the investment accounts “based on the percentage derived from the relative values represented in each party’s column” on the spreadsheet, and that “when Glen ultimately made the stock transfer to Rayna,” he would first “assess the current value of each account on the date of the stock transfer” and then “apply the percentages derived from the allocations” set out on the spreadsheet. The court acknowledged that it could have been clearer in the drafting, noting that the example listed in Paragraph 171(b) “might suggest otherwise” than what the court intended. But the court stated that, “when this example is considered in its proper context,” it “should now be clear” that the court “intended for Rayna to receive the appreciation on her portions of” the investment accounts. In other words, the court intended for the parties to share the risk of depreciation and to share any appreciation that accrued between trial and entry of the Decree.
¶56 This is a completely reasonable interpretation of the Decree. Indeed, this interpretation comes nowhere close to a clear abuse of the wide discretion afforded to the court in interpreting a document it personally drafted. The court’s explanation more or less conclusively establishes the meaning of the Decree, and it should operate to resolve the parties’ on-the-merits dispute about the meaning of the Decree in Rayna’s favor.
C. Mintz I Was Incorrect on the Relevant Point
¶57 Next, I offer my view that Mintz I was wrong when it declared that allowing the district court to resolve this ambiguity would require “an amendment to the [D]ecree” because it would require the court to “read language into the [D]ecree in a way that modified or amended it.” See 2023 UT App 17, ¶¶ 44, 46 (cleaned up). In my view, this is not a correct statement of the law.
¶58 Garden-variety ambiguity in a document’s language does not “mean that the [document] is unenforceable for vagueness.” See Regal RealSource LLC v. Enlaw LLC, 2024 UT App 95, ¶ 21, 554 P.3d 1112. Moreover, “[t]he use of language, the application of which is uncertain, does not necessarily prevent the existence of a valid contract,” and “[i]f a court is able to ascertain the intent of the parties using the proper rules of construction and principles of equity, then the contract is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable.” 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 60 (2024). Indeed, the presence of ambiguity does not necessarily signal that an amendment to the document’s language is necessary in order to enforce it; to the contrary, “the presence of ambiguity simply signals that additional litigation and analysis is required,” including assessment of what the drafters intended by the ambiguous language. See Regal RealSource, 2024 UT App 95, ¶ 21.
¶59 Here, the Decree was ambiguous on the relevant point: who should bear the risk of depreciation (or enjoy the benefit of appreciation) on the investment accounts post-trial and pre-Decree? Some language in the Decree (and the associated spreadsheet) pointed one way, and some the other. What is required in that situation is simple clarification about what the drafter of the document meant by the ambiguous language. No modification or amendment of, or addition of language to, the Decree was necessary to resolve the issue. The parties simply disagreed about what the existing language (and attached spreadsheet) meant.
¶60 This sort of dispute can be, and often is, resolved in a simple motion to enforce. Indeed, it should go almost without saying that a court must first resolve any relevant ambiguity in a governing document’s language before it can determine whether a party violated the terms of that document. See, e.g., C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 241 (N.M. 1991) (stating that, if a “court finds ambiguity” in a contract, that ambiguity must first be resolved before the court can decide issues of “breach and damages”); cf. Regal RealSource, 2024 UT App 95, ¶ 22 (“If the parties reached agreement on the material terms of a contract but simply chose to use imprecise language to memorialize that agreement, the contract is ambiguous but enforceable once a factfinder makes a ruling, after considering extrinsic evidence, on the intended meaning of the ambiguous terms.”).
¶61 Two recent examples come to mind in which this court has determined that creative interpretive exercises related to motions to enforce did not involve modifications to divorce decrees. First, in Christensen v. Christensen, the divorce decree awarded the equity in the family’s minivan to the wife and ordered the husband to deliver certain documentation to the wife to facilitate a sale of the minivan. 2026 UT App 104, ¶ 7, 596 P.3d 1025. The husband delivered the minivan to the wife but did not timely deliver the necessary documentation. Id. ¶ 8. Because of this, the wife was unable to sell the minivan, which was later repossessed. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. She then filed a motion to enforce the divorce decree, and as a remedy she asked the court to order the husband to pay her an amount equivalent to the minivan’s lost equity. Id. ¶ 9. The court granted the motion, and the husband appealed, asserting that the decree didn’t require him to pay the wife any money and that the relief she sought was not enforcement but, instead, was a modification that would have required her to file a petition to modify. Id. ¶ 19. We disagreed, holding that “the district court’s order directing [the husband] to pay [the wife] an amount equivalent to the lost equity in the minivan merely enforced, but did not modify, the terms of the” divorce decree, because the intent of the decree was to provide for the minivan’s equity to end up in the wife’s possession. Id. ¶ 28.
¶62 Similarly, in Elder v. Elder, the decree awarded the family’s townhouse to the wife and ordered the husband to “be responsible for any loans associated with the townhouse and have them paid off” following issuance of the decree. 2024 UT App 68, ¶ 18, 550 P.3d 488. The husband failed to timely pay off the loans, compelling the wife to sell the townhouse for a “discounted” amount after she paid off the loan herself. Id. ¶¶ 18–20. The wife filed a motion to enforce, asking the court to order the husband to “reimburse” her for the loan amount that she had to satisfy at the time of the sale. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20. The court granted that motion, and the husband appealed, asserting that the relief the wife requested was a modification (and not enforcement) and therefore could not be awarded in the absence of a petition to modify. Id. ¶¶ 1, 13, 16. We affirmed the court’s order as proper enforcement, determining that the order “appropriately carried out and gave effect to the terms of the decree.” Id. ¶ 30 (cleaned up).
¶63 Here, when Rayna approached the district court—way back before Mintz I—and asked the court to “enforce” the Decree by ordering Glen to pay Rayna her fair share of the appreciation, she was simply seeking interpretation—and not amendment—of the Decree. The district court misperceived her request back then, refusing to award her a proportional share of the appreciation because, in its view (at the time), such an order would require modification of the Decree. See Mintz I, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 9. And we affirmed that determination, stating that “we agree[d] with the district court that to award the relief that Rayna sought would require the district court to read language into the [D]ecree in a way that modified or amended it.” Id. ¶ 46 (cleaned up).
¶64 On remand, the district court—to its credit—realized that its previous legal ruling in this regard had been wrong, and it informed Rayna that it believed it could interpret the Decree’s language regarding entitlement to appreciation without modifying or amending the Decree. The court invited Rayna to refile her motion to enforce, and this time the court considered that motion on its merits and granted it, stating (correctly, in my view) that the motion was simply “a motion to enforce the language in the original [D]ecree.” The court once again made clear, as it had in the previous minute entry ruling, that it had “never intended what Glen [was] arguing” and that it had always “intended what Rayna [was] arguing, which is that at the time of the [D]ecree, whatever up or down happened with those specific accounts was to be shared by the parties.”
¶65 In my view, for the reasons stated, the district court got this issue right the second time: it had the authority to clarify the meaning of the Decree in an enforcement proceeding. The court got it wrong the first time, and we compounded that error by (incorrectly) affirming that incorrect decision.
D. The Mandate Rule Is Generally Applicable Here
¶66 Ordinarily, a district court may change its mind and reconsider a matter, at least prior to final judgment having been entered in the case. See Fleming v. Dullanty, 2025 UT App 128, ¶ 47, 579 P.3d 365 (“While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any appeal, the court is free to reconsider an earlier decision.” (cleaned up)); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (stating that an order “that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be changed at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties”).
¶67 But the situation changes once a matter has been up on appeal and has been remanded to the district court. In that situation, a “branch of the law of the case doctrine known as the mandate rule” operates to limit a court’s opportunity to revisit the issues that were the subject of the appeal and remand. Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ¶ 12, 218 P.3d 583. The mandate rule “dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case.” Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Utah 1995). And the rule “dictates that a prior decision of a district court becomes mandatory after an appeal and remand.” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d 588. “The mandate rule, unlike the law of the case before a remand, binds both the district court and the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court.” Id. And as relevant here, “[t]he mandate is also binding on the appellate court should the case return on appeal after remand.” Id.
¶68 In Mintz I, we issued a square ruling on the relevant issue, affirming the district court’s (erroneous, see supra Part I.C) initial ruling that it could not adjudicate Rayna’s motion to enforce because awarding her the relief she sought would require modification or amendment of the Decree. 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 46. Pursuant to the mandate rule, and unless an exception to that rule applies, that ruling was binding upon the district court on remand and is binding upon us now.
¶69 Rayna argues, on appeal, that the mandate rule has no application here, even generally, because—she asserts—our ruling was merely jurisdictional and didn’t have anything to say about the actual meaning of the Decree. But this argument is unpersuasive because the mandate rule applies to the Mintz I ruling, as far as it goes, and—jurisdictional or not—that ruling forbade the district court from reengaging on the question of whether it could adjudicate Rayna’s motion as a motion to enforce. Thus, I agree with the lead opinion, see supra ¶¶ 9–11, 14, that the mandate rule applies here as a general matter.
E. The Manifest Injustice Exception Should Be Applied Here
¶70 But I disagree that the mandate rule bars the district court’s actions here, because I would apply one of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine to take this case out from under the strictures of the mandate rule. “There are three exceptional circumstances in which the law of the case doctrine does not apply: (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 34, 196 P.3d 588 (cleaned up); see also Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038–39 (Utah 1995) (discussing these three exceptions in the context of an appellate court potentially reconsidering one of its own decisions).[20] In this case, I think the third exception—the one for manifest injustice—is applicable.
¶71 First, the decision by both the district court (pre-remand) and by this court (in Mintz I)—that clarification of ambiguities requires a modification of the Decree and cannot be handled in an enforcement proceeding—was clearly erroneous. See supra Part I.C. The district court has already recognized the error of its ways, and I think we should recognize the error of ours.
¶72 Second, the prior decision, if left intact, would work a manifest injustice. After hearing the evidence presented at a multi-day trial, the district court made findings that intended for each party to receive a certain percentage from the investment accounts, no matter when those accounts ended up being divided.
Unfortunately, the court failed to use unambiguous language to describe that intent in the Decree. But allowing the drafter of that document to clear up the ambiguity and give full effect to his intent, formed after hearing evidence from the parties in a multi-day trial, is something that furthers justice and adjudication of cases according to their merits. And preventing the factfinder’s intention from being fulfilled is, almost by definition, a form of injustice, no matter the amount or issue at stake. But here, the amount of money is sizeable, even in the context of this particular case. In its order, the district court computed that Glen had kept $847,886.12 more than the court had intended for him to keep.
¶73 In this case, I commend the trial judge for having the courage to admit that he was wrong the first time, and for doing so even in a case in which we had affirmed his original decision. That not only took guts, but it bespeaks an admirable level of thoughtfulness and self-reflection. It’s often hard for humans, judges included, to admit they were wrong. And it’s important that judges—of all humans—be able to operate in a regime where they have the ability, within a given case, to recognize and give voice to the need for reconsideration, so that decisions can, as often as possible, be rendered according to principles and laws and not just because that’s the way the decision was made the first time. I recognize that the manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine is not something that courts often resort to, or even something that courts should often resort to, and that’s probably for the best. After all, finality is a worthy principle too. But the exception exists for a reason, and we should not hesitate to apply it in those rare situations in which we’re convinced we got it wrong the first time and in which injustice will result if we don’t. In my view, this is one of those cases.
¶74 On this point, the lead opinion characterizes my position as “lean[ing] into the idea that the manifest injustice exception . . . allows a district court to ‘clarify’ any final judgment found ambiguous after appeal.” See supra ¶ 22 n.16. Of course, this is quite a stark mischaracterization of my position. I naturally do not advocate for the manifest injustice exception to be applied anytime a district court, post-remand, wants to clarify an ambiguity in a divorce decree. What’s different in this case is that both the district court (the first time, before Mintz I) and this court (in Mintz I) got an important point of law wrong, namely, whether clarifying ambiguities in orders requires modification of those orders or, instead, involves mere enforcement of them. Under the lead opinion’s resolution of this case, the Utah courts’ two-level mistake on this point of law—a mistake the lead opinion here doesn’t meaningfully try to defend—operates to prevent the drafter of the document (here, the district court as factfinder) from being able to clarify a material ambiguity and bring interpretation of the Decree into line with what the evidence at trial supported and with what the court’s intent was in making its ruling. When two levels of court get a point of law wrong, and that mistake then results in the intent of the factfinder after a multi-day trial not being given effect, and then someone loses nearly $850,000 as a result, that feels like manifest injustice to me.
¶75 For all of these reasons, I would give voice to the district court’s interpretation of the Decree that it personally drafted, and I would affirm that court’s decision to clarify the Decree and to enforce it according to the court’s original intention regarding the allocation of appreciation (or depreciation) in the parties’ investment accounts.
Utah Family Law, LC | divorceutah.com | 801-466-9277
Footnotes
- [1] To avoid the confusion caused by using a common surname, we refer to the parties by their given names. ↩
- [2] The dissent maintains we are failing to listen to the district court and give it an opportunity to tell us what it meant. See infra ¶ 37. But we did listen to the district court’s own reading and interpretation of its own order in Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, 525 P.3d 534, cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). And we relied on its interpretation. Now we are bound by that previous reading and interpretation. Accordingly, the issue in this appeal is not about reviewing a district court’s first opportunity to interpret its own order. Instead, we must address a situation where the district court ruled one way before the appeal but subsequently tried to reinterpret its “intent” in the face of the mandate rule. ↩
- [3] The dissent characterizes the procedural landscape of this case as “convoluted” and perceives manifest injustice as flowing from that circumstance. See infra ¶ 39. Therein lies, in part, the misperception and significant danger inherent in the dissent’s approach. One can imagine in any case, but particularly those cases flowing from domestic disputes, the utter chaos that will ensue if we give free license for parties to attempt to relitigate settled appellate issues on the basis that a district court can reinterpret its final judgment based on a post hoc retrospective analysis of its original “intent.” Unfortunately, most appeals in domestic cases rarely mark the end of litigation; instead, parties often continue to litigate for years, if not decades. To jettison the finality of issues laid to rest by an appeal is a mistake we should not condone. ↩
- [4] “On motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [if] the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application . . . .” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). ↩
- [5] “The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice. After a notice of appeal has been filed and while the appeal is pending, the mistake may be corrected only with leave of the appellate court.” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a). ↩
- [6] Glen also argues that the district court’s enforcement order runs contrary to the plain language of the Decree. We address this assertion in our treatment of manifest injustice below. ↩
- [7] The dissent makes it sound like this court came up with the idea that Rayna’s request required modification. This court didn’t invent that; instead, it was the district court’s interpretation of its own order. There simply was no ambiguity reflected or expressed in the district court’s rulings until the district court bought into that idea on remand. Fundamentally, the district court changed its mind, but in doing so it has embraced two diametrically opposed positions. That is not a reasonable approach. ↩
- [8] As a practical matter, if Rayna wanted to avoid the legal effect of the mandate, she could have filed a petition for certiorari with our supreme court. She did not. ↩
- [9] By way of context, the “Lines” mentioned here refer to numbered lines of an appendix listing the six investment accounts. ↩
- [10] Unless we are missing something, this amount attributed to Line 27 appears to be an errant reference to a previous version of the appendix that listed $1,100,000 as the value of the securities to be transferred in relation to that particular asset. The Decree was later amended and the asset division was adjusted in a revised appendix to $1,081,251. The district court and the parties seem to have overlooked—and continue to overlook even after remand proceedings—this change. ↩
- [11] Paragraph 171(b) has “to” here instead of “the” in what appears to be an obvious typographical error. ↩
- [12] Paragraph 171(b) originally ended at this point. But it was later amended to include what follows. The appendix was also amended. ↩
- [13] Rayna received a larger share of these accounts to offset other assets Glen received, most notably a residence. ↩
- [14] To be precise, two of the accounts depreciated in value, but the other four appreciated in value. This means that under our mandate, Rayna receives a larger amount on these two accounts than she would have under her preferred outcome. ↩
- [15] To be clear, the 2020 motion to enforce is distinct from the motion to enforce at issue in this appeal. ↩
- [16] The dissent’s analysis does not demonstrate such obvious error either. Instead, the dissent leans into the idea that the manifest injustice exception to the mandate rule allows a district court to “clarify” any final judgment found ambiguous after appeal. See infra ¶¶ 72–75. But such an approach does not hold water: if an order needs to be clarified, then the prior ruling cannot be said to be obvious error. And absent obvious error, manifest injustice simply cannot be found. Moreover, the dissent’s expansive reading provides no limiting principle to govern revisiting settled issues post-appeal under a claim of “clarification.” ↩
- [17] Rayna asks for attorney fees on this issue. She is not entitled to them because she has not prevailed on appeal. ↩
- [18] Nothing prevents Glen from bringing this issue to the district court’s attention later, in which event the court would then have the opportunity to weigh in on the issue in the first instance. ↩
- [19] The lead opinion contends that, in Mintz I, “we did listen to the district court’s own reading and interpretation of its own order.” See supra ¶¶ 2 n.2, 8. This is presumably a reference to the fact that this court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional determination that it lacked authority to even engage with clarifying the actual intent of its own order because such an effort would constitute modification (instead of mere enforcement) of the Decree. See Mintz I, 2023 UT App 17, ¶¶ 44, 46, 60. But listening to the district court’s (erroneous, see infra Part I.C) jurisdictional determination about a legal question is different from listening to the court’s own substantive factual explanation of what its intent was (about whether appreciation or depreciation in the financial accounts should be shared) when it personally drafted the Decree after considering the evidence presented at trial. Because it believed (at the time) that it was jurisdictionally barred from doing so, the district court didn’t weigh in on the substance at all prior to Mintz I, and therefore we—by definition—could not have listened to the court on this point in Mintz I, because there was nothing yet to listen to. It was only after Mintz I, on remand, that the district court finally weighed in on the merits of the question and finally told us what its intention was in drafting the Decree. ↩
- [20] I acknowledge some ambiguity in the caselaw regarding whether the three exceptions to the law of the case doctrine—including the manifest injustice exception—are available in cases in which the mandate rule applies. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037–39 (Utah 1995). But on a number of occasions, we have issued decisions that have appeared to assume that these exceptions could apply in mandate-rule cases. See NPEC LLC v. Miller, 2018 UT App 85, ¶¶ 11–12, 427 P.3d 357 (considering the applicability of the exceptions after concluding that the mandate rule applied); accord State v. MacNeill, 2016 UT App 177, ¶¶ 39–41, 380 P.3d 60 (also stating that “subject to the applicability of some exception, the mandate rule” bars the claim). And more recently than Thurston, our supreme court hung a footnote discussing the three exceptions from the end of a sentence discussing the mandate rule. See Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2015 UT 85, ¶ 26 & n.6, 358 P.3d 1103. From all of this, I proceed under the assumption that the three exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are potentially applicable even in mandate-rule cases. The lead opinion operates under that same assumption. See supra ¶¶ 14–16. ↩